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ABSTRACT
A scheme that publishes aggregate information about sen-
sitive data must resolve the trade-off between utility to in-
formation consumers and privacy of the database partici-
pants. Differential privacy [5] is a well-established definition
of privacy—this is a universal guarantee against all attack-
ers, whatever their side-information or intent. In this paper,
we present a universal treatment of utility based on the stan-
dard minimax rule from decision theory [13] (in contrast to
the utility model in [8], which is Bayesian).
In our model, information consumers are minimax (risk-
averse) agents, each possessing some side-information about
the query, and each endowed with a loss-function which
models their tolerance to inaccuracies. Further, informa-
tion consumers are rational in the sense that they actively
combine information from the mechanism with their side-
information in a way that minimizes their loss. Under this
assumption of rational behavior, we show that for every fixed
count query, a certain geometric mechanism is universally
optimal for all minimax information consumers. Addition-
ally, our solution makes it possible to release query results
at multiple levels of privacy in a collusion-resistant manner.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy Mechanisms: Agencies such as medical establish-
ments, survey agencies, governments use and publish aggre-
gate statistics about individuals; this can have privacy im-
plications. Consider the query: Q: How many adults from
San Diego contracted the flu this October? The government
can use the query result to track the spread of flu, and drug
companies can use it to plan production of vaccines. How-
ever, knowledge that a specific person contracted the flu
could be used to deny her health insurance based on the
rationale that she is susceptible to disease. As discussed
in [20], and as is exemplified by [21, 16], seemingly benign
data publications can have privacy implications. Thus, it
is important to think rigorously about privacy. The frame-
work of differential privacy [3] does this, and is applicable
widely (see Section 2.8).
Mechanisms guarantee differential privacy by perturbing re-
sults – they add random noise to the query result, and guar-
antee protection against all attackers, whatever their side-
information or intent (see Section 2.1 for a formal definition).
Our Utility Model: The addition of noise increases pri-
vacy but intuitively reduces utility of the query result. To
understand this privacy-utility trade-off, we propose a for-
mal decision-theoretic model of utility. Decision-theory is a
widely applied field that provides mathematical foundations
for dealing with preferences under uncertainty. The use of
decision theory in this context is appropriate because, as we
discussed above, mechanisms guarantee differential privacy
by introducing uncertainty.
In our model of utility (see Section 2.3 for details), the
user of information, i.e. the information consumer has side-
information—for instance, knowledge of the population of
San Diego is an upper bound on the result of the query Q.
It has a loss-function that expresses it’s tolerance to inac-
curacy. It is rational in the sense that it combines informa-
tion from the mechanism with its side-information optimally
with respect to its personal loss-function. It is risk-averse
in the sense that it would like to minimize worst-case loss
over all scenarios.1
Given the privacy parameter, the loss-function and the side-
information of an information consumer it is possible to
identify an optimal mechanism – a mechanism that is differ-
entially private and that maximizes its utility. See Section
2.4.3 for an algorithm to find such a mechanism.
Non-Interactive Settings: Very often aggregate statis-
tics, like answers to Q, are published in mass media as op-
posed to following a query-response form [18]. In such cases
neither the information consumer nor it’s loss-function and
side-information are known in advance. Thus it seems hard
to identify the optimal mechanism for a information con-
sumer.
Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to deploy an opti-
mal mechanism without knowledge of the information con-
sumer’s parameters. Furthermore, this mechanism is uni-
1Ghosh et al. [8] propose a model with most of these fea-
tures, but assumes that information consumers are Bayesian
and have a prior over the query-result.
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versally optimal for all information consumers, no matter
what their side-information or loss-function.
How can we identify the optimal mechanism without knowl-
edge of the information consumer’s parameters? The ap-
parent paradox is resolved by relying on the information
consumers’ rationality, i.e., each information consumer uses
its personal loss-function and side-information to actively
transform the output of the deployed mechanism. For a
certain class of queries called count queries, when the de-
ployed mechanism is a certain geometric mechanism, this
transformation is effective enough to result in the optimal
mechanism for the information consumer—a fact that we
will establish via linear-algebraic proof techniques.
Multiple Levels of Privacy: We also show how to si-
multaneously release the query result at different levels of
privacy to different information consumers. This is useful,
for instance, when we want to construct two versions of the
report on flu statistics, one which prioritizes utility for the
eyes of government executives, and a publicly available In-
ternet version that prioritizes privacy.
A naive solution is to perturb the query results differently,
independently adding differing amounts of noise each time.
The drawback is that consumers at different levels of privacy
can collude and combine their results to cancel the noise (as
in Chernoff bounds). An alternate way is to correlate the
noise added to different outputs. We give an algorithm to
achieve this that makes the data release collusion-resistant.
In this paper we focus on a single query; the complexity
comes from a rich model of consumer preferences, where we
consider different utility functions for each consumer and
optimize for each of them. [1, 10, 9] exploit similarities
between the queries to obtain extension to multiple queries
with good utility guarantees. However, they do not consider
a rich consumer preference model. Our results could be used
as a building block while answering multiple queries.
2. MODEL AND RESULTS
We gave a informal description of our model and results
in the Introduction. In this section, we formally define our
model and discuss the main results. The proofs of the results
are presented in Sections 3, 4.
2.1 Privacy Mechanisms and Differential Pri-
vacy
A database is a collection of rows, one per individual. Each
row is drawn from an arbitrary domain D; for instance, in
our running example, a row of the database has the name,
age, address and medical records of a single individual. A
database with n rows is thus drawn from the domain Dn.
We will focus on a class of queries, called count queries,
that frequently occur in surveys: Given a predicate p : D →
{True, False}, the result of a count query is the number of
rows that satisfy this predicate, a number between 0 and the
database size, n. Q is an example of a count query with the
predicate: individual is an adult residing in in San Diego,
who contracted flu this October. Though simple in form,
count queries are expressive because varying the predicate
naturally yields a rich space of queries.
We guarantee differential privacy to protect information of
individual database participants. Differential privacy is a
standard, well-accepted definition of privacy [3] that has
been applied to query privacy [7, 5, 17], privacy preserv-
ing machine learning [1, 11] and economic mechanism de-
sign [15]. A fixed count query maps the database d to a num-
ber which belongs to the set N . A privacy mechanism M
for a fixed count query is a probabilistic function that maps
a database d ∈ Dn to the elements of the set N = {0 . . . n}.
These can be represented, for each d ∈ Dn, by {md,r}r∈N ,
which gives for each database d ∈ Dn the probability that M
outputs r. For the database d, the mechanism releases a per-
turbed result by sampling from the distribution {md,r}r∈N .
The Geometric Mechanism [8] is a simple example of a pri-
vacy mechanism. It is a discrete version of the Laplace
Mechanism from [5].
Definition 1 (α-Geometric Mechanism). When the true
query result is f(d), the mechanism outputs f(d) + Z. Z
is a random variable distributed as a two-sided geometric
distribution: Pr[Z = z] = 1−α
1+α
α|z| for every integer z.
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Figure 1: The probability distribution on outputs
given by the Geometric Mechanism for α = 0.2 and
query result 5.
Informally, a mechanism satisfies differential privacy if it in-
duces similar output distributions for every two databases
that differ only in a single individual’s data, thereby ensur-
ing that the output is not sensitive to any one individual’s
data2. Formally, differential privacy is defined as follows [5]:
Given a privacy parameter α ∈ [0, 1] and two database
d1, d2 ∈ Dn that differ in at most one individual’s data,
a mechanism M is α-differentially private, if for all elements
r in the range of the mechanism : 1
α
·xd1,r ≥ xd2,r ≥ α·xd1,r.
2Thus any attack on an individual’s privacy that can be
constructed using the perturbed query result with this indi-
vidual present in the database can also be constructed, with
a similar success rate, without this individual present in the
database. See See [5, 12] for details of such semantics of
differential privacy.
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The parameter α can be varied in the interval [0, 1] to vary
the strength of the privacy guarantee—when α = 0, the
above definition is vacuous and there is no privacy, whereas
when α = 1, we effectively insist on absolute privacy– the
query result cannot depend on the database because we re-
quire distributions over perturbed results to be identical for
neighboring databases.
2.2 Oblivious Mechanisms
We will focus in this paper on a class of privacy mechanisms
that are oblivious. A mechanism is oblivious if it sets up an
identical distribution over outputs for every two databases
that have the same unperturbed query result. Naturally,
an implementation of an oblivious mechanism need only
have access to the true query result—the input—and can
be oblivious to the database itself. An oblivious mechanism
for count queries can be expressed by the set of probabil-
ity masses for every i ∈ N : {xi,r}r∈N , where xi,r is the
probability that the mechanism outputs r when the true
result is i. Appendix A shows that this restriction to oblivi-
ous mechanisms is without loss of generality. The geometric
mechanism (Definition 1) only depends on the query result
f(d) and not on the database d itself; so it is a oblivious
mechanism.
The query result for a count query can change by at most
one when we change any one row of the database, so we can
rewrite the definition of differential privacy as follows:
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy for Count Queries). An
oblivious mechanism for count queries for α ∈ [0, 1] is α-
differentially private if for all i ∈ {0 . . . n− 1}, r ∈ N :
1
α
xi,r ≥ xi+1,r ≥ αxi,r.
Observe that the geometric mechanism is α-differentially
private because for two adjacent inputs i, i + 1 ∈ N , and
any output r ∈ N, xi,r
xi+1,r
∈ [α, 1/α].
2.3 Minimax Information Consumers
We now discuss our model of an information consumer’s util-
ity. The loss-function l(i, r) : N ×N → R specifies the loss
of the information consumer, given the mechanism outputs
r when the true result is i. We only assume that the loss-
function is monotone non-decreasing in |i − r|, for every i.
That is, the consumer becomes unhappier as the returned
answer is further away from the true result.
Consider some examples of valid loss-functions: The loss-
function l(i, r) = |i − r| quantifies the mean error—for our
query Q, this loss-function may be a reasonable one for
the government who want to keep track of the rise of flu.
The loss-function l(i, r) = (i − r)2 quantifies the variance
in the error—this may be reasonable for a drug company
who wants to ensure that they don’t over-produce or under-
produce the flu drug. The loss-function l(i, r) =
{
0 if i = r
1 if i 6= r ,
measures the frequency of error.
Additionally, we will assume that the information consumer
has side information S ⊆ N , i.e., the information consumer
knows that the query result cannot fall outside the set S. For
instance, knowledge of the population of San Diego yields an
upper-bound on the query result. The drug company may
also know how many people bought its flu drug this month,
yielding a lower bound on the query result.
For any specific input i, the loss-function l allows us to eval-
uate the information consumer’s dis-utility as the expected
loss over the coin tosses of the mechanism:
∑
r∈N l(i, r)·xi,r.
To quantify the overall loss, we follow the minimax decision
rule, i.e., we take the worst-case loss over all inputs in the
set S [13]. This amounts to the information consumers be-
ing risk-averse. Hence, the dis-utility of the mechanism x to
the consumer c is :
L(x) = max
i∈S
∑
r∈N
l(i, r) · xi,r (1)
2.4 Interactions of InformationConsumerswith
Mechanisms
As mentioned in the Introduction, information consumers
actively interact with the mechanism to induce a new mech-
anism; we now discuss the mechanics of this interaction.
2.4.1 Motivation
The following example argues why a rational information
consumer will not accept the mechanism’s output at face
value.
Example 1. Recall the query Q defined in the Introduction.
Suppose that the information consumer is a drug company,
who knows that l individuals in San Diego bought its flu drug
in the month of October. Thus the query result Q must be
at least l; the information consumer cannot conclude that
the query result is exactly l because some individuals with
flu may have bought a competitors drug, or bought no drug
at all. Thus it has side-information S = {l . . . n}.
Suppose we deploy the geometric mechanism for the query Q.
This mechanism returns with non-zero probability outputs
outside the set {l . . . n}. Such outputs are evidently incorrect
to the information consumer, and naturally it makes sense
for the information consumer to map these results within
the set {l . . . n}. Though it is not clear what the best way of
doing so is, a reasonable rule may be to re-interpret results
less than l as l, and results larger than n as n.
2.4.2 Feasible Interactions
Before we discuss the optimal way for an information con-
sumer to interact with the mechanism, we describe the space
of feasible interactions. On receiving a query result r from
the mechanism, the consumer can reinterpret it as a different
output. This reinterpretation can be probabilistic and can
be represented by a set of probability masses {Tr,r′ : r′ ∈ N}
which gives for each result r, the probability that the con-
sumer will reinterpret it as the output r′. Such an inter-
action induces a new mechanism for the user. Suppose
the deployed mechanism is represented by the set of prob-
ability masses {yi,r : i, r ∈ N}, and the induced mech-
anism as the probability masses {xi,r′ : i, r ∈ N}, then
xi,r′ =
∑
r∈N yi,r · Tr,r′ . We formalize this in a definition.
Definition 3 (Derivability). Given two mechanism x and
y, we say that mechanism x can be derived from y if and
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only if, for every r ∈ N , there exists a set of probability
masses {Tr,r′ : r′ ∈ N} such that for every i, r′ ∈ N :
xi,r′ =
∑
r∈N yi,r · Tr,r′ .
2.4.3 Optimal Interactions
Given a deployed mechanism y, the optimal interaction T ∗
is one that minimizes the information consumer’s maximum
loss on the induced mechanism. The optimal interaction can
be computed using a simple linear program. There are n2
variables: one for each T ∗r,r′∈N . The objective function is
obtained by minimizing the loss to the consumer if it uses
interaction T ∗. The constraints are obtained from the fact
for each r, the entries T ∗r,r′ form a probability distribution
and hence sum up to 1 and that all entries of T ∗ are positive.
The actual linear program is given as :
minimize max
i∈S
∑
r∈N
xi,r · l(i, r)
xi,r =
∑
r∈N
yi,r · T ∗r,r′ ∀i ∈ N,∀r ∈ N∑
r′∈N
T ∗r,r′ = 1 ∀r ∈ N
T ∗r,r′ ≥ 0 ∀r ∈ N,∀r′ ∈ N
2.5 Optimal Mechanism for a Single Known
Information Consumer
Identifying the optimal mechanism for a specific consumer
reduces to the following: Identify a level of privacy α with
which to release the result. Find the consumer’s loss-function
and side-information. Identify an α-differentially private
mechanism such that the mechanism induced by the con-
sumer’s optimal interaction (as described in the previous
section), has the best possible utility.
In the case of a single information consumer, we can obvi-
ate the need for the information consumer to reinterpret the
deployed mechanism’s output: Suppose there is a mecha-
nism y with post-processing T that induces a mechanism x.
Clearly, presenting x directly to the information consumer
yields at least as much utility for it. All we have to en-
sure is that x is α-differentially private, and a simple proof
(omitted) shows that this is indeed so.
Thus, to identify the optimal mechanism for a specific infor-
mation user, it suffices to search over α-differential mecha-
nisms. For a given consumer c with loss-function
L(l, S) = max
i∈S
∑
r∈N
xi,r · l(i, r)
and privacy parameter α, the optimal differentially private
mechanism Mc is the solution to a simple linear program.
Like in the previous section, there are n2 variables one for
each matrix entry of the mechanism x. The objective is
to minimize the user’s loss function. The constraints are
obtained by the facts that
1. x is differentially private. So the variables xi,r must
satisfy Definition 2
2. For each input i, elements xi,r form a probability dis-
tribution and hence sum up to 1.
3. All elements xi,r are positive
Writing this as an optimization problem we get:
minimize max
i∈S
∑
r∈N
xi,r · l(i, r)
xi,r − α · xi+1,r ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N \ {n}, ∀r ∈ N
α · xi,r − xi+1,r ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N \ {n}, ∀r ∈ N∑
r∈N
xi,r = 1 ∀i ∈ N
xi,r ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀r ∈ N
We can convert it into a Linear Program, the solution of
which gives us x∗.
minimize d
d−
∑
r∈N
xi,r · l(i, r) ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ S
xi,r − α · xi+1,r ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N \ {n}, ∀r ∈ N
α · xi,r − xi+1,r ≤ 0 ∀i ∈ N \ {n},∀r ∈ N∑
r∈N
xi,r = 1 ∀i ∈ N
xi,r ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N,∀r ∈ N
To deploy this mechanism x∗, we first compute the true
query result, say i, then sample the perturbed result r from
the distribution {x∗i,r : ∀r ∈ N}, and release the sampled
result. Table 1(a) gives an example of a optimal mechanism
for a particular information consumer.
2.6 OptimalMechanism forMultipleUnknown
Information Consumers
How can we extend the results of the previous section to
multiple consumers? The naive solution is to identify and
separately deploy the optimal mechanism for each informa-
tion consumer as described in the previous section.
There are two reasons why this is undesirable. First, the
naive solution results in the release of several re-randomizations
of the query result—this allows colluding consumers to com-
bine their results and cancel out the noise leading to a degra-
dation in privacy; see [15] for a discussion,
Second, solving the linear program that identifies the op-
timal mechanism for a user requires the knowledge of the
consumer’s parameters; knowledge that is often unavailable
when the decision of which mechanism to deploy is made.
Consider a report published on the Internet. It is not clear
who the information consumers are going to be.
Our main result works around these issues successfully.
Theorem 1. Consider a database d, count query q, k con-
sumers and privacy levels α1 < . . . < αk. There exists a
mechanism M that constructs k results r1 . . . rk, and releases
result ri to the ith information consumer, such that:
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
2/3 5/17 1/25 1/98
1/6 7/11 7/44 2/49
2/49 7/44 7/11 1/6
1/98 1/25 5/17 2/3


4/3 1/4 1/16 1/48
1/3 1 1/4 1/12
1/12 1/4 1 1/3
1/48 1/16 1/4 4/3


9/11 2/11 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 2/11 9/11

(a)The Optimal Mechanism (b)G3, 1
4
(c)Consumer Interaction
Mechanism with access to the database. Mechanism with access to the user parameters.
Table 1: This shows the optimal mechanism for a consumer c with loss-function l(i, r) = |i − r| and side-
information S = {0, 1, 2, 3}. n = 3, α = 1/4.
1. (Collusion-Resistance) Mechanism M is αi′ -differentially
private for any set I of colluding information con-
sumers who combine their results. Here, C ⊆ {1 . . . k}
and i′ = min{j : j ∈ C}.
2. (Simultaneous Utility Maximization) Suppose that the
ith consumer is rational and interacts optimally with
the mechanism (as described in Section 2.4.3), then
its utility is equal to that of the differentially private
mechanism tailored specifically for it (the mechanism
from Section 2.5).
We now describe the release mechanism M . The ith stage of
the mechanism Mi is just the αi-geometric mechanism. We
shall prove in Lemma 3, that for any α > β, the α-geometric
mechanism can be derived from the β-geometric mechanism:
that is there is an implementable mechanism Tα,β such that
if we use Tα,β to reinterpret results given by the β-geometric
mechanism, we get the α-geometric mechanism. The query
results ri are not generated independently of each other,
they are obtained by successive perturbations: the result
ri of mechanism Mi is given as input to the mechanism
Ti = Tαi,αi+1 . Hence, the (i + 1)th stage mechanism Mi+1
is just the αi+1-geometric mechanism. This specifies how the
noise added to the query results is corelated. We describe
the mechanism formally in Algorithm 1. In Section 4.1 we
show that it is collusion-resistant.
Consumer i interacts optimally with the published query
result ri to get a result tailored specifically for it. In Sec-
tion 4.2, we prove that the interaction yields optimal utility
for the consumer. The main idea is that the optimal mecha-
nism can be factored into two parts – The first is a database
specific mechanism which has access to the database but
not to the user parameters. In our case this is the αi-
geometric mechanism. The second is the user specific mech-
anism, which has access to the user loss-function and side-
information and the perturbed query result (given by the
first mechanism), but not to the database itself. Table 1
shows these two factors of the optimal mechanism discussed
in Section 2.5.
We briefly discuss proof techniques: Section 3 completely
characterizes mechanisms derivable from the geometric mech-
anism using linear algebraic techniques. Section 4 applies
this characterization twice: the first application shows that
a α-geometric mechanism can be derived by re-randomizing
the output of a β-geometric mechanism so long as α > β.
The second application shows that the mechanism induced
by the interaction of a rational information consumer with
the geometric mechanism is an optimal solution to the linear
program mentioned in Section 2.5.
2.7 ComparisonwithBayesian InformationCon-
sumers
An alternative to the Minimax decision rule is the Bayesian
decision rule. Ghosh et al. [8] prove an analogous result
to Theorem 1 for all Bayesian information consumers. We
briefly compare the models and the proof techniques.
The main distinction between the two models is their treat-
ment of side-information. The Bayesian model requires agents
to have a prior over all possible scenarios (true query re-
sults). Often, in practice, agents do not behave consistent
with the preferences of the Bayesian model, perhaps because
they find it hard to come up with meaningful priors [14, Ex-
ample 6.B.2,6.B.3], or are genuinely risk-averse [14, Section
6.3].
As discussed in [8], Bayesian information consumers employ
deterministic post-processing, unlike minimax information
consumers which employ randomized post-processing (For
example, see Table 1). Handling this extra complexity re-
quires us to construct a broader characterization of mech-
anisms derivable from the geometric mechanism—Section 3
presents a complete characterization in terms of a simple
condition on the probability masses xi−1,j , xi,j , xi+1,j . Our
proof avoids the LP based techniques and counting argu-
ments of [8], and consequentially strictly generalizes and
gives a simpler proof of the main result of that paper. In
addition, our characterization enables us to release data at
multiple levels of privacy in a collusion-resistant manner.
2.8 Related Work
A recent thorough survey of the state of the field of differen-
tial privacy is given in [4]. Dinur and Nissim [2], Dwork et
al. [6] establish upper-bounds on the number of queries that
can be answered with reasonable accuracy. Most of the dif-
ferential privacy literature circumvents these impossibility
results by focusing on interactive models where a mecha-
nism supplies answers to only a sub-linear (in n) number of
queries. Count queries (e.g. [2, 7]) and more general queries
(e.g. [5, 17]) have been studied from this perspective.
Hardt and Talwar [9] give tight upper and lower bounds on
the amount of noise needed to ensure differential privacy
for d non-adaptive linear queries, where the database is a
vector in Rn. Hay et al. [10] give a way to increase accuracy
of answering multiple related queries while ensuring that the
query results follow consistency constraints.
Blum et al. [1] focus attention to count queries that lie in
a restricted class; they obtain non-interactive mechanisms
that provide simultaneous good accuracy (in terms of worst-
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case error) for all count queries from a class with polynomial
VC dimension. Kasiviswanathan et al. [11] give further re-
sults for privately learning hypotheses from a given class.
The use of abstract “utility functions” in McSherry and Tal-
war [15] has a similar flavor to our use of loss-functions,
though the motivations and goals of their work and ours
are unrelated. Motivated by pricing problems, McSherry
and Talwar [15] design differentially private mechanisms for
queries that can have very different values on neighboring
databases (unlike count queries); they do not consider users
with side information and do not formulate a notion of mech-
anism optimality (simultaneous or otherwise).
Our formulation of the multiple privacy levels is similar to
Xiao et al. [22]. However, they use random output per-
turbations for preserving privacy, and do not give formal
guarantees about differential privacy.
3. CHARACTERIZING MECHANISMS
DERIVABLE FROM THE GEOMETRIC
MECHANISM
In this section we give a characterization of all mechanisms
that can be derived from the geometric mechanism. Recall
that differential privacy imposes conditions on every two
consecutive entries (x1, x2) of every column: x1 ≥ αx2 (and
x2 ≥ αx1). Our characterization imposes syntactically simi-
lar conditions on every three consecutive entries (x1, x2, x3)
in a column: (x2−α ·x3) ≥ α(x1−α ·x2). Neither condition
implies the other. This characterization is both necessary
and sufficient for any differentially private mechanism to be
derivable from the geometric mechanism.
We defined feasible consumer interactions in Section 2.4.2.
A slightly different way of representing these is to arrange
the probability masses in a n × n matrix (Tr,r′)r,r′∈N . We
say that a matrix is (row) stochastic if the sum of elements
in each row is 1 and all elements are non-negative. We say
that a matrix is a generalized (row) stochastic matrix if the
if the sum of elements in each row is 1, but with no condition
on individual entries. If the deployed mechanism is given by
the matrix y, and the reinterpretation by the matrix T , then
the new mechanism is given by the matrix x = y · T .
We define a version of the Geometric Mechanism whose
range is restricted to {0, . . . , n}, which will be easier to work
with since it can be easily represented as a matrix.
Definition 4 (Range-Restricted Geometric Mechanism).
For a given privacy parameter α, when the true query re-
sult is k ∈ [0, n], the mechanism outputs Z(k) where Z(k)
is a random variable with the following distribution for each
integer z:
Pr[Z(k) = z] =

1
1+α
· α|z−k| if z ∈ {0, n}
1−α
1+α
· α|z−k| if 0 < z < n
0 otherwise.
This mechanism is equivalent to the geometric mechanism in
the sense that we can derive this from the geometric mech-
anism and derive the geometric mechanism from its range-
restricted version. We shall refer to both as the Geometric
Mechanism and denote the matrix by Gn,α. (Table 2).
For ease of notation, we shall denote by G′n,α the matrix
obtained by multiplying the columns 1 and n of Gn,α by
(1 + α) and all other entries by 1+α
1−α . Table 2 shows the
matrices of Gn,α and G
′
n,α. We are now ready to state the
characterization.
Theorem 2. Suppose M is any oblivious differentially pri-
vate mechanism. Then M can be derived from the geomet-
ric mechanism if and only if every three consecutive en-
tries x1, x2, x3 in any column of M satisfy (x2 − αx1) ≥
α(x3 − αx2).
The key insight is to think of each column in M and in Gn,α
as a vector. Looking at the problem through this linear
algebraic lens, we see that deriving M from Gn,α amounts
to proving that each column of M lies in the convex hull of
the (vectors which form the) columns of Gn,α. In Lemma 1,
we show that Gn,α is non-singular, hence each column of
M can be represented as a linear combination of columns of
Gn,α.
Lemma 1. det(Gn,α) > 0.
Proof. Since G′n,α can be obtained by multiplying each entry
in the first and last column of Gn,α by (1+α) and entries in
all other columns by 1+α
1−α , detG
′
n,α = (1+α)
2( 1+α
1−α )
n−2 detGn,α.
Hence, we only need to prove that detG′n,α > 0. We prove
this by induction on n. For n = 2, we explicit calculation
yields G′2,α = (1 − α2). For the general case, perform the
column transformation C1 ← C1−αC2 on G′n,α. Expanding
on the first column gives us detG′n,α = (1−α2) detG′n−1,α.
Hence, by induction, detG′n,α = (1− α2)n−1.
We need to show that each column of M is actually a convex
combination of columns of G. We can write M = Gn,α ·
T for some matrix T . Hence, T = G−1n,α · M . Note that
Gn,α and M are both generalized stochastic matrices. Since
the set of all non-singular generalized stochastic matrices
forms a group [19], G−1n,α is a generalized stochastic matrix.
And since generalized stochastic matrices are closed under
multiplication, T is also a generalized stochastic matrix and
is uniquely defined. All we need to prove is that all entries in
T are non-negative. We shall use Cramer’s Rule to calculate
the entries of T and complete the proof.
Given a n × n matrix G and a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)t,
define G(i, x) as the matrix where the ith column of G has
been replaced by x.
Let tj be the j
th column of T . ti,j denotes the i, j entry
in T . Observe that, Gn,α · tj = mj . By Cramer’s Rule,
we get that ti,j =
detGn,α(i,mj)
detGn,α
. To calculate this, we shall
explicitly calculate the value of detGn,α(i,mj).
Lemma 2. Given Gn,α and a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
t:
1. detGn,α(1, x) > 0 iff x1 > αx2
2. detGn,α(n, x) > 0 iff xn > αxn−1
3. detGn,α(i, x) ≥ 0 if and only if (x2 − αx1) ≥ α(x3 −
αx2) : For 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
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1−α
1+α

1
1−α · 1 α α2 . . . 11−α · αn−1
1
1−α · α 1 α . . . 11−α · αn−2
1
1−α · α2 α 1 . . .
...
. . .
1
1−α · αn−1 αn−2 . . . 11−α · 1


1 α α2 . . . αn−1
α 1 α . . . αn−2
α2 α 1 . . .
...
. . .
αn−1 αn−2 . . . 1

Gn,α G
′
n,α
Table 2: The Range Restricted Geometric Mechanism
Hence, when M satisfies the condition that for every three
consecutive entries x1, x2, x3 in any column (x2 − αx1) ≥
α(x3 − αx2), then si,j ≥ 0 for all i, j. This proves that M
can be derived from the geometric mechanism.
To prove the converse, suppose that there is a column c and
row i of M such that ((1+α2)mi,j−α(mi−1,j+mi+1,j)) < 0,
then si,c = detG(i,mc)/detG < 0. This says that M can-
not be derived from G. This completes the proof of Theo-
rem 2.
We now prove Lemma 2, using similar column transforma-
tions as we used in Lemma 1 to calculate detGn,α(i, x) for
an arbitrary vector x.
Lemma 2. Given Gn,α and a vector x = (x1, . . . , xn)
t:
1. detGn,α(1, x) > 0 iff x1 > αx2
2. detGn,α(n, x) > 0 iff xn > αxn−1
3. detGn,α(i, x) ≥ 0 if and only if (x2 − αx1) ≥ α(x3 −
αx2) : For 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Proof. We will prove the above properties for G′n,α. Since,
G′n,α is obtained from Gn,α by multiplying columns with
positive reals, the properties above will continue to hold for
Gn,α. We divide the proof into cases depending on the value
of i :
1. i = 1 : We repeatedly do the column transforma-
tion Cn ← Cn − αCn−1 to get that detG′n,α(1, x) =
(1− α2)n−2
∣∣∣∣x1 αx2 1
∣∣∣∣ = (1− α2)n−2(x1 − αx2). Hence,
detG′n,α(1, x) > 0 ⇐⇒ (x1 > αx2).
2. i = n : We can do the same column transformations
to get that detG′n,α(n, x) = (1 − α2)n−2
∣∣∣∣1 xn−1α xn
∣∣∣∣ =
(1 − α2)n−2(xn − αxn−1). Hence, detG′n,α(n, x) >
0 ⇐⇒ (xn > αxn−1).
3. 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 : Similarly, for the general case we get
that detG′n,α(i, x) = (1 − α2)n−3
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 xi−1 α2
α xi α
α2 xi+1 1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ =
(1 − α2)n−2((1 + α2)xi − α(xi−1 + xi+1)). Hence,
detG′n,α(i, x) > 0 ⇐⇒ (x2 − αx1) ≥ α(x3 − αx2).
4. APPLICATIONSOFTHECHARACTER-
IZATION
We show two applications of the characterization result of
Theorem 2. The first one gives us a way to simultaneously
release data to consumers at different levels of privacy. As a
second application we show how to obtain a optimal mech-
anism for an information consumer without knowing its pa-
rameters.
4.1 Information-Consumers at Different Pri-
vacy Levels
Suppose we want to release the answer of the query to differ-
ent information consumers. We represent the level of privacy
of a consumer c by the privacy parameter αc. Given true
result r, we will release rc to consumer c such that the mech-
anism is αc-differentially private. We expect that consumers
at different levels of privacy do not share query results with
each other which is enforced via, say, non-disclosure agree-
ments. Even when they do share data, we want our mech-
anism to be collusion-resistant and not leak privacy– the
colluding group should not get any more information about
the database than the consumer with access to the least
private result i.e., the one with the smallest α .
We now describe a mechanism that achieves this. The next
lemma gives us a way to “add” more privacy to an existing
geometric mechanism.
Lemma 3. For two privacy parameters α ≤ β, the geo-
metric mechanism Gn,β can be derived from the mechanism
Gn,α i.e., there exists a stochastic matrix Tα,β such that
Gn,β = Gn,α · Tα,β.
Proof. Theorem 2 states that Gn,β can be derived from Gn,α
if and only if for every three consecutive entries x1, x2, x3 in
any column of Gn,β , (x2 − αx1) ≥ α(x3 − αx2). We check
this condition for each of the three forms that consecutive
entries in each row of Gβ,n can have:
1. (βi, βi+1, βi+2) : (1+α2)βi+1−α(βi+βi+2) = βi(β+
α2β − α− αβ2) = βi(β − α)(1− αβ) > 0.
2. (β, 1, β) : (1 + α2)1 − α(β + β) = 1 + α2 − 2αβ >
(1− α)2 > 0.
3. (βi+2, βi+1, βi) : (1 +α2)βi+1−α(βi +βi+2) = βi(β+
α2β − α− αβ2) = βi(β − α)(1− αβ) > 0.
This shows that Tα,β = G
−1
n,α · Gn,β is a stochastic matrix.
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Algorithm 1: Releasing Query Result to Consumers at
Multiple Levels of Trust.
ht Input: True Query Result r. k privacy levels given by
parameters α1 < α2 < . . . < αk.
Output: Query Results r1, r2, . . . , rk to be released.
Define T1 = Gα1,n.
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k do
Compute post-processing matrix Ti+1 such that
Gαi+1,n = Gαi,n · Ti+1.
end
By Lemma 3, each Ti is a stochastic matrix. Hence, we can
think of Ti as a mechanism – Given any input k we sample
from the probability distribution given by the kth row of Ti
which we represent by Ti(k)
Let r0 = r.
for 1 ≤ i ≤ k do
ri = Ti(ri−1) is obtained by treating ri−1 as the true
query output and applying mechanism Ti to it.
end
Release the query results r1, r2, . . . , rk to consumers at
privacy levels α1, . . . , αk.
The release mechanism is given in Algorithm 1. We con-
clude the section by proving that Algorithm 1 is collusion-
resistant.
Lemma 4. Any subset C = {c1 < · · · < ct} ⊆ {1, . . . , k}
of colluding information consumers who have access to query
results R(C) = {rc1 . . . rck}, released at privacy levels αc1 , . . . , αck ,
respectively, can only reconstruct as much information about
the database d by combining their results as c1 can working
alone.
Proof. The matrixGn,α1 and post-processing matrices Tαci ,αci+1
can be calculated by anyone. Hence, given the random coin
tosses made by the algorithm, Lemma 3 shows that rcj can
be obtained from rci for cj > ci. Given rc1 , having access to
R(C) can at most reveal information about these coin tosses
that Algorithm 1 made. Since, these coin tosses do not de-
pend on the database, any information about the database
that is reconstructed from R(C) can also be reconstructed
by consumer c1 (who has access to result rc1) alone.
4.2 Universal UtilityMaximizingMechanisms
We now prove that if we deploy the geometric mechanism
(Definition 4), then the interaction of every information con-
sumer will yield a mechanism that is optimal for that con-
sumer. Since, the geometric mechanism is not dependent
on any information consumer’s loss-function or side infor-
mation, it is simultaneously optimal for all of them.
Our result proves that all optimal mechanisms can be de-
rived from the geometric mechanism. However, there do
exist differentially private mechanisms (which are not opti-
mal for any information consumer) that cannot be derived
from the geometric mechanism. We give an example of such
a mechanism in Appendix B.
The first part of the proof shows that every two adjacent
rows of every optimal mechanism must satisfy certain con-
dition; if it does not, we can perturb the mechanism in a
way to yield a differentially private mechanism with strictly
better utility. The second part of the proof leverages this
lemma and the characterization from Theorem 2 to complete
the proof of Theorem 1.
Lemma 5. For every monotone loss-function L(l, S) =
maxi∈S
∑
r∈N l(i, r) · xi,r, there exists an optimal mecha-
nism x such that for every two adjacent rows i, i+ 1 of this
mechanism, there exist column indices c1 and c2 such that:
1. ∀j ∈ 1...c1 : αxi,j = xi+1,j
2. ∀j ∈ c2...n : xi,j = αxi+1,j
3. Either c2 = c1 + 1 or c2 = c1 + 2.
Proof. We define the function L′ : M → R given by L′(x) =∑
i∈N
∑
r∈N xi,r · |i− r|. Consider the total order  on R2
given by (a, b)  (c, d) ⇐⇒ {(a > c) or (a = c and b >
d)}. Let x be an optimal mechanism for the loss-function
(L,L′) according to the order defined above. The idea here
is that there are multiple mechanisms that optimize L and
using L′ we isolate the ones with the property that we want.
We prove by contradiction that x satisfies the constraints
given above.
Assume otherwise. Then there exist rows i, i+1 and columns
j, k; k > j such that αxi,j < xi+1,j and αxi+1,k < xi,k.
We shall construct a differentially private mechanism y for
which (Ly, L
′
y) is strictly smaller than (Lx, L
′
x) which is a
contradiction since we assumed that x minimized (L,L′).
We divide the proof into two cases : i ≤ (j + k)/2 and
i > (j + k)/2. Consider the case i ≤ (j + k)/2 first. For
i′ ∈ {1 . . . i} set yi′,j ← xi′,j +δxi′,k and yi′,k ← (1−δ)xi′,k.
For all other values set yl,m = xl,m. We first show that y is
a differentially private mechanism. Let the set of changed
elements C = {yl,m : m ∈ {j, k} and l ≤ i}. The set of
unchanged elements U is all the remaining yl,m. All privacy
constraints involving elements only from U are satisfied since
they were satisfied in M . The privacy constraints involving
only elements in C continue to hold since they are the same
linear combinations of corresponding elements from M . We
only need to check that the privacy constraints are satisfied
when one element is from C and another from U . But this
only happens for yi,j , yi+1,j and yi,k, yi+1,k. By assumption,
αxi,j < xi+1,j and αxi+1,k < xi,k. We can choose a small
enough δ such that αyi,j = α(xi,j + δxi,k) < xi+1,j = yi+1,j
and αyi,k = α(1 − δ)xi,k < xi+1,k = yi+1,k. Also, for m ∈
{j, k}, yi,m > xi,m > αxi+1,m = yi+1,m . This proves that
y satisfies differential privacy.
Now, we shall prove that y has strictly smaller loss than x.
For any row r ∈ {1, . . . , i}, the change in loss due to row r
is ∑
i∈N
l(r, i)xr,i −
∑
i∈N
l(r, i)yr,i
= (l(r, j)xr,j + l(r, k)xr,k)− (l(r, j)yr,j + l(r, k)yr,k)
= (l(r, j)xr,j + l(r, k)xr,k)
− (l(r, j)(xr,j + δxr,k) + l(r, k)(xr,k − δxr,k)
= δxr,k(l(r, k)− l(r, j))
≥ 0 since l(i, j) is monotonic in |i− j|.
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The total loss L = maxr∈S
∑
i∈N l(i, r) · xi,r and since so
Lx ≥ Ly. Also ∑i∑r xi,r · |i − r| > ∑i∑r yi,r · |i − r|.
This means that (Lx, L
′
x)  (Ly, L′y). But x was an optimal
mechanism with respect to . This gives us a contradiction.
The proof for the case i > (j + k)/2 is similar. For i ≥
i′ set yi′,k ← xi′,k + δxi′,j and yi′,j ← (1 − δ)xi′,j . The
same arguments as above now hold for this definition of y
as well.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. We state it again
for convenience.
Theorem 1. Consider a database d, count query q, k con-
sumers and privacy levels α1 < . . . < αk. There exists a
mechanism M that constructs k results r1 . . . rk, and releases
result ri to the ith information consumer, such that:
1. (Collusion-Resistance) Mechanism M is αi′ -differentially
private for any set I of colluding information con-
sumers who combine their results. Here, C ⊆ {1 . . . k}
and i′ = min{j : j ∈ C}.
2. (Simultaneous Utility Maximization) Suppose that the
ith consumer is rational and interacts optimally with
the mechanism (as described in Section 2.4.3), then
its utility is equal to that of the differentially private
mechanism tailored specifically for it (the mechanism
from Section 2.5).
Proof. Algorithm 1 is used to deploy geometric mechanism
at different levels of privacy. Lemma 3 shows that it is al-
ways possible to deploy geometric mechanism this way. This
proves that the deployed mechanisms are differentially pri-
vate. Lemma 4 proves that the release is αci′ -differentially
private even for any set C of colluding consumers, where
i′ = min{j : j ∈ C}. This completes the proof of part 1.
To prove part 2, we concentrate on a single trust level with
privacy parameter α. We prove the result by contradic-
tion. Assume there is an information consumer c with loss-
function l and side-information S, whose interaction with
Gn,α does not optimize its loss. Let M be an optimal dif-
ferentially private mechanism for c that satisfies Lemma 5.
Since, c cannot optimize its loss by interacting with Gn,α,
M cannot be derived from the geometric mechanism. We
prove that this implies that M is infeasible which is a con-
tradiction.
We know from Theorem 2 that there exists a column j
of M and rows i, i + 1, i + 2, such that the three entries
xi,j , xi+1,j , xi+2,j satisfy
(1 + α2)xi+1,j − α(xi,j + xi+2,j) < 0. (2)
Recall the pattern of every pair of adjacent rows of M from
Lemma 5. Let k be the unique column that satisfies αxi,k <
xi+1,k and αxi+1,k < xi,k, or if there is no such column,
let it be the last column such that αxi,j = xi+1,j . Let
a =
∑
l<k xi,l, b = xi,k, b
′ = xi+1,k, b′′ = xi+2,k and
c =
∑
l>k xi,l. Rewrite Equation (2) to get: 0 ≤ xi+1,j −
αxi+2,j < α(xi,j − αxi+1,j) =⇒ xi,j > αxi+1,j Thus, by
Lemma 5, k ≥ j. We now claim that:
(1 + α2)b′ − α(b+ b′′) < 0 (3)
This is true from Equation (2) if k = j. Otherwise rewrite
Equation (2) to get 0 ≤ xi+1,j−αxi,j < α(xi+2,j−αxi+1,j) =⇒
xi+2,j > αxi+1,j . Thus, by Lemma 5, it must be that
α · b′′ = b, Further, by privacy b ≥ αb′ and so, b > α2b′.
This proves the claim.
Because M is a generalized stochastic matrix,
∑
l xi,l =∑
l xi+1,l = 1. Thus, a+ b+ c = 1 and α · a+ b′ + c/α = 1.
Using these equations, we have:
a =
1− b− α+ b′α
1− α2 and c =
α− α2 + bα2 − b′α
1− α2 (4)
We now prove that M is not feasible.∑
l
xi+2,l ≥ α2 · a+ b′′ + c/α2
=
α3 − bα3 − α4 + b′α4 + b′′α− b′′α3 + 1− α− b′ + bα
α(1− α2)
=
1− α+ α2
α
+
(b+ b′′)α− b′(1 + α2)
α
> 1
The first step is from Equation (2) and Lemma 5, the second
is by Equation (4), the third is by rearranging and the fourth
holds because the first summand is always at least 1 and the
second is strictly positive by Equation (3).
5. CONCLUSION
We give a minimax model of utility for information con-
sumers that is prescribed by decision theory. We show that
for any particular count query, the geometric mechanism
is simultaneously optimal for all consumers, assuming that
consumers interact rationally with the output of the mech-
anism. This is particularly useful in publishing aggregate
statistics, like the number of flu infections in a given region,
to a wide unknown audience, say on the Internet.
An open question is to investigate whether similar guar-
antees are possible for multiple queries and other types of
queries.
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APPENDIX
A. THEREALWAYSEXISTSANOPTIMAL
MECHANISM THAT IS OBLIVIOUS
In Section 2 we restricted attention to oblivious mechanisms.
While natural mechanisms (such as the Laplace mechanism
from [5]) are usually oblivious, we now justify this restriction
from first principles. Specifically, we show that for every in-
formation consumer with a loss-function over databases and
side information over query results, there exists a oblivious
loss-function and side-information, such that the optimal
utility with the oblivious loss-function is no more than the
optimal utility with the non-oblivious loss-function.
Consider a non-oblivious mechanism x. For the minimax
information consumer with loss-function l over databases
and side information S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n}, the utility of this
mechanism is given by
max
d∈S⊆Dn
∑
r∈N
xd,r · l(f(d), r) (5)
The following lemma proves that obliviousness is without
loss of generality i.e. there always exists an oblivious mech-
anism whose loss is lower than or equal to the loss of the
best non-oblivious mechanism.
Lemma 6. Fix a database size n ≥ 1 and privacy level α.
For every minimax information consumer with loss-function
l and side information S ⊆ {0, 1, . . . , n}, there is an α-
differentially private mechanism that minimizes the objective
function (5) and is also oblivious.
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Proof. We shall now construct a differentially privacy mech-
anism x′ that is oblivious and whose loss is not greater than
the loss of x. This will prove our assertion.
We construct a partition E of all the databases, according to
the query output. All databases that have the same query
output belong to the same subset of the partition. For a
database d, let E(d) = {d′ : q(d) = q(d′)}. For r ∈ N and
d ∈ Dn, define x′E(d),r = avgd′∈E(d) xd′,r. It is clear that x′
is an oblivious mechanism.
First we show that x′ is α-differentially private. Fix two
databases d1, d2 ∈ Dn such that d1 and d2 differ in exactly
one row; We need to show that αx′d1r ≤ x′d2r. Assume
f(d1) 6= f(d2), otherwise the proof is trivial.
For any database of E(d1), we can generate all its neigh-
bors (databases that differ in exactly one row) in E(d2) by
enumerating all the ways in which we can change the query
result by exactly 1. For instance when f(d1) = f(d2) + 1,
pick one of the n−f(d1) rows that satisfy the predicate in d1
and change its value to one of those that violates the pred-
icate. This process is identical for all databases of E(d1),
and so for all d ∈ E(d1), the number of neighbors of d that
belong to the set E(d2) is the same (does not vary with d).
Similarly, for all d ∈ E(d2), the number of neighbors of d
that belong to the set E(d1) is the same.
Consider the following set of inequalities that hold because
x is α-differentially private: d ∈ E(d1), d′ ∈ E(d2), where
d1 and d2 are neighbors, αxdr ≤ xd′r. By the argument
in the above paragraph, all the databases in E(d1) appears
equally frequently in the left-hand-side of the above inequal-
ity and all the databases in E(d2) equally frequently in the
right-hand-side. Summing the inequalities and recalling the
definition of x′ completes the proof of privacy.
Now we show that x′ does not incur more loss than x. The
loss for x′ is given by maxd∈S⊆Dn
∑
r∈N x
′
E(d),r · l(f(d), r).
Suppose the worst loss for x′ occurs for the partition E(d1).
L(x′) =
∑
r∈N
x′E(d1,r) · l(f(d1), r)
=
∑
r∈N
avgd∈E(d1)(xd,r) · l(f(d), r)
≤ max
d∈E(d1)
∑
r∈N
xd,r · l(f(d), r)
≤ max
d∈S⊆Dn
∑
r∈N
xd,r · l(f(d), r) = L(x).
This completes the proof.
B. A DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE MECH-
ANISMTHATISNOTDERIVABLEFROM
THE GEOMETRIC MECHANISM
Consider the mechanism M given by the following matrix.
M(i, j) gives the probability of returning j when the true
query result is i. We can verify that M is 1
2
-differentially
private.
M =

1/9 2/9 4/9 2/9
2/9 1/9 2/9 4/9
4/9 2/9 1/9 2/9
13/18 1/9 1/18 1/9

We claim that M cannot be derived from the geometric
mechanism. We can explicitly calculate G−1
3, 1
2
· M to see
that M is not derivable from the geometric. Instead we
shall use the characterization from Theorem 2. If we look at
elements M(0, 1),M(1, 1),M(2, 1) , then (1 + α2)M(1, 1)−
α(M(0, 1)+M(2, 1)) = 1.25× 1
9
− 1
2
× ( 2
9
+ 2
9
) = −0.75
9
. This
proves that M cannot be derived from G3, 1
2
.
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